In 2005, the World Bank-supported Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF)6 undertook a project to review international experiences with managing UNPs, but stopped somewhat short of developing a â€oeready-to-useâ€• framework that developing countries could use to draft and implement policies to better manage such proposals.7 It is in this context that a May verdict this year by a Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India assumes great significance for the adoption of special competitive procedures for award of projects that originate as UNPs (Ravi Development v. Shree Krishna Prathisthan8). The two-Judge Bench, while upholding the validity of the â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• method adopted by the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) on a pilot basis with respect to a proposal received from a private developer, echoed a number of important concerns relating to transparency in the award of such projects.
The Supreme Court suggested that the State Government of Maharashtra may consider, inter alia, that (1) the nature of the â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• method and particulars are published in advance; (2) the nature of projects that can come under such a method is published; (3) the authorities to be approached with respect to such project plans are mentioned/notified; (4) the various fields of the projects that can be considered under this method are mentioned/notified; (5) rules are formulated regarding time-limits on the approval of the project and respective bidding; (6) rules are formulated for procedures to be followed after a project has been approved by respective authorities to be considered under the method; and (7) all persons interested in such developmental activities are given equal and sufficient opportunity to participate in such ventures and that there is healthy inter se competition amongst such developers.9 The Court made it clear that its suggestions are not exhaustive, and that the State of Maharashtra is free to incorporate any other clauses for transparency and proper execution of the scheme while framing regulations/instructions on these lines.10
While a small number of States in India have adopted the â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• method for incentivising private participation in public infrastructure projects, the details of implementation vary across States; and many of these State regulations fall somewhat short of the expectations that the Supreme Court has so clearly outlined in its verdict. This short article therefore aims to examine the mechanics of competitive award of UNPs and the procedures adopted by different States in order that a common set of specific issues for reform can be identified and implemented.
Unsolicited proposals: An introduction
An unsolicited proposal is commonly defined as â€oea submission by private parties of specific project concepts that are unrequested by public procurement agenciesâ€•.11 Different country systems and international procurement frameworks have differing variations of this essential theme, with the United States defining an UNP as one that, inter alia, does not address a previously published agency requirement or one that does not amount to an advance proposal for a known agency requirement that can be acquired by competitive methods.12 India, on the other hand, does not have an exact legal or regulatory definition of an UNP, but many of its States allow for procurement of PPP-based infrastructure projects or concessions through unsolicited proposals that are defined as private sector generated proposals not in response to notified â€oerequests for proposalsâ€• (RFPs).13 UNCITRALâ€™s â€oeM Legislative Provisions on Privately Financed Infrastructure Proposalsâ€• similarly define an UNP as â€oeany proposal relating to the implementation of an infrastructure project that is not submitted in response to a request or solicitation issued by the contracting authority within the context of a selection procedureâ€•.14 Permitting UNPs encourages the private sector to bring useful and innovative ideas for project development, 15 while they also target infrastructure needs in remote regions where not enough bidders are likely to express an interest.16 Some other important policy reasons for the Governments to allow for special treatment of UNPs are costefficiency through project development costs being borne by the private sector proposer, and rapid project development due to private sector involvement and consequent private interest in shortening time-frames to keep costs low.17 While some countries such as Columbia place an outright ban on considering UNPs, others such as Sri Lanka require the adoption of normal procedures dealing with solicited proposals to be applied equally to such proposals.18 On the other hand, some countries have adopted rules so as to allow the original proponent (OP) a predefined advantage within in an otherwise fully competitive bidding process, examples being India (in a number of its States), Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, South Korea, The Philippines, South Africa and Taiwan.19
There are two broad approaches that have been adopted in these countries allowing for special considerations for the OP of the UNP, these being the â€oeBonusâ€• system and the â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• system. Under the â€oeBonusâ€• OP is awarded a â€oebonusâ€• as price advantage in an otherwise fully competitive procurement process, and his offer is selected if his quoted price falls within a stipulated percentage of the best evaluated offer or bid. While this bonus could be a fixed numberâ€"10% in the case of Chile; the maximum value of the bonus could also be placed under an upper limit, with the exact quantum of benefit being determined by other characteristics of the tender process, as in the case with South Korea.20 In Chile, the OP may sell the bonus to another bidder; and if the OP loses the bid or chooses not to bid, then the winning bidder/offeror may also have to compensate the OP for project development costs.21
Under the â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• system, on the other hand, a private sector partner submits a proposal, and the government agency awarding the contract must then invite comparative proposals in a public forum. Competitors then have the opportunity to better the OPâ€™s proposal.22 If the Government finds one of the alternative proposal as more appealing, the OP has an opportunity to match the proposal and win the contract.23
Competitors in a â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• environment generally perceive their chances of winning the contract as extremely slim, given the limited time for them to prepare competing proposals and the close relationships developed between the government officials involved and the original proponent during the negotiation period.24 Recent variations of the â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• system, as in South Africa, have included a â€oeBest and Final Offerâ€• (BAFO) system with mul rounds of tendering in which the OP is given the advantage of automatically participating in the final round; and in Argentina, where multiple rounds of tendering may take place if the difference between the OPâ€™s offer and the best offer made by its competitors is within a predetermined percentageâ€"essentially a hybrid of the â€oeBonusâ€• and the â€oeSwiss Ch systems.25
Asymmetry issues with unsolicited proposals
The very process of entertaining UNPs, and the subsequent award of such proposals through the â€oeBonusâ€• and â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• route introduces various asymmetries into the procure process. Firstly, there is an element of â€oeinformational asymmetryâ€• between an OP and its competitors, since the OP gets more time to prepare his preliminary and final proposals, often in the range of 6-12 months, often with considerable government assistance and sponsorship, while his competitors may only get as short as 2?4 weeks within which to devote their internal resources to come up with reasonably well-prepared competing offers.26
Secondly, the â€oeBonusâ€• and â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• systems introduce an element of â€oebidding asymmetryâ€• b and potential competitors. One element of this bidding asymmetry is the asymmetry on â€oetimeâ€•â€"of differing time-frames fo project development to the OP and of responding to the RFP for its competitors: essentially, the OP gets considerably more time to respond and to submit a fresh counteroffer to the best evaluated proposal originating from its competitors. The second sub-element of bidding asymmetry is the â€oepriceâ€• asymmetry in case of â€oeBonusâ€• system through a price preference within a price-band in favour of the OP; while there are both negotiation and price asymmetries in the â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• system since only the OP essentially gets an opportunity to make the BAFO after one or more rounds of negotiationâ€"an opportunity that is denied to its competitors who are not authorised to submit an equal number of negotiated responses.
Quite naturally then, there is some level of discomfort with widespread use of unsolicited proposals in the public sector on grounds of lack of transparency, and lack of fair and equal treatment of potential bidders.27 Both Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank, for instance, while recognising the importance of likely innovation through the encouragement of unsolicited proposals, do not allow such procedures under their published procurement guidelines.28 In a 2006 report, ADB advocates that appropriate proposals be bid out using fully transparent and competitive procedures without any obligations towards the project developer while permitting the reimbursement of project development expenses to the OP;29 and in a 2007 report, it notes that UNPs create a potential for inefficient litigation.30 Similarly, in a 2007 paper published by World Bank, it recognises that unsolicited proposals are usually associated with lack of competition and transparency and thus lending themselves more easily to corruption.31 Amongst the international frameworks, only UNCITRALâ€™s Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects32 and its Model Legislative Provisions on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects33 allow the submission of UNPs and the granting of a premium for submitting the original proposal,34 but UNCITRAL framework does not provide meaningful guidance on the circumstances under which such UNPs should be accepted or the procedural safeguards for allowing the same, except for stating that an UNP must be one for which selection procedures have not been announced or initiated; and which is determined by the Government to be in the â€oepublic interestâ€• and preliminarily â€oefeasibleâ€•.
The Government of India (GoI), and its premier oversight bodyâ€"the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)â€"also advocate the use of fully competitive and transparent procedures for infrastructure procurement under GoIâ€™s guidelines for PPP projects35 and under guidelines of CVC respectively.36 The Planning Commission of India appears to have a slightly differing viewpoint in that while it advised the Government of Goa sometime in 2007 to take up the â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• route only as an exception,37 some of its expert committees recently recommended the use of â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• system in higher education projects,38 in PPP social sector projects39 and in the context of certain government contracts in the coal and lignite industry.40
The Practical Lawyer Opposition to the use of the Swiss Challenge system has also been tactical: business entities have opposed the adoption of such special procedures in States where they are not the original proponents, while they could be simultaneously pursuing such projects in other States as OPs themselves. Sporadically, this competition for market shares has resulted in litigation in certain States in India, once the potential benefits of litigation appear to outweigh the costs.
Different States, different strokes
A small number of States in India have adopted the â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• procedure for competitive award of unsolicited proposals, but the modalities and details vary widely across States. For instance, Rajasthanâ€™s (draft) â€oePublic-Private Partnership Policy, 2008â€•41 and â€oeSocial Sector Viability Gap Funding Schemeâ€•42 of 2007 permit the Government to approve the scale and scope of a suo motu proposal or project undertaken through â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• approach, but both these policies are silent on the modalities of implementation and selection of private partners through the â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• route.
The Rajasthan Road Development Act (RRDA)43 offers better guidance for receipt and processing of UNPs in that it allows for the receipt of such proposals where no scheme has been initiated for the development of anyroad44, and the accompanying rules require that such proposals are first technically and financially checked and certified to be viable, and after obtaining the administrative approval of the State Government, can be put to open competition with the modification that the OP is given an opportunity to take up the project on the lowest offered rates by any of its competitors.45
Karnataka requires an assessment of UNP on parameters of public need, and technical feasibility/suitability,46 while the Andhra Pradesh Infrastructure Development Enabling Act (the APIDE Act)47 allows for adoption of the â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• approach in cases of projects where:
-the Government or government agency will be required to provide asset support; -financial incentives in the form of contingent liabilities or direct financial support are required to be provided; -exclusive rights are conferred on the developer; and/or -extensive linkages i.e. support facilities for the project such as water connection, etc. are needed.48
The PPP guidelines of the Government of NCT of Delhi49 do not provide for similar guidance on circumstances addressing allowability of receipt of UNPs, and time-frames for project development or for counteroffer by the OP. Gujarat, which was the first State in India to introduce a de facto â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• based procurement procedure for the award of directly negotiated proposals,50 but its rules also do not adequately address the transparency issues noted by the Supreme Court in its verdict.
Formulating recommendations for reform
An uncontrolled, unregulated environment for UNPs, or one that allows for UNPs to be entertained without clear guidance can be potentially problematic, and in such an ambiguous environment, the only time a genuine third party would actually become aware of the possibility of acceptance of an UNP is when an RFP has already been issued by the government agency soliciting counterproposals to an already accepted and processed unsolicited proposal.51 Lack of guidance is therefore not really an acceptable option for any of the States, as this lack of guidance would eventually translate into a non-transparent and non-uniform procurement regime: a situation that would go clearly against the important suggestions made by the Supreme Court in its recent verdict.
Overall, it is possible to identify a number of important sub-issues within each of these major elements; some of these being: -content requirementsâ€"whether UNPs must relate to concepts and techniques that are new, unique, innovative, or â€oenon-obviousâ€•; -purpose requirementsâ€"whether UNPs must satisfy public purpose, or government needs, and/or satisfy â€oepreliminary feasibilityâ€• tests; -whether UNPs are allowed only when full and open competitive processes are specifically determined to be unavailable or unsuitable; -the extent of governmentâ€™s involvement in project developmentâ€"merely regulatory, or a deeper level of involvement through information and resource sharing; -the extent of government participation in the project itselfâ€"through funding, or through physical assets; -the time of submission requirementsâ€"whether proposals can be submitted only if there is no RFP, or proposals can be submitted when there is no RFP and the proposals are not under consideration in government agencies in some form or the other; -the reasonability and limitations of the time for an OP to deliver a fully developed project to the Government; -the amount and reasonableness of time provided to the competitors to respond to the RFP, and time for the OP to respond and counter; -the extent of information made available to competitors; -the tradeability of OPâ€™s rights; and -the number of rounds of negotiations in a â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• based approach: this could be one round of negotiation as provided for in most frameworks, or the number of rounds could be more than one. In fact, the more the rounds of negotiations take place, the greater is the extent to which the OPâ€™s valuation would be revealed to potential competitors, thus permitting better price testing of UNPs in the procurement marketplace.
Based on the manner in which different national and international frameworks deal with some of these aspects, certain safeguards in the form of specific guidance appear to be necessary in order to address concerns over the possible misuse of the UNPs:
Firstly, the State procurement regulations should explicitly provide for allowability or unallowability of UNPs through specific insertion in procurement rules. Information must be made clearly available in procurement guidelines or in project announcements to include details on the type of special procedure permitted (â€oeSwiss Challengeâ€• system, â€oeBo system or some other variant) and the quantum of preference (percentage of price-preference, number of rounds of negotiations permitted, and other relevant details).
Secondly, it may be examined if UNPs are to be permitted where they do not relate to new or innovative projects, or where the project is â€oeobviousâ€• to a reasonably prudent person engaged in the relevant sector. For instance, a project using government land for roads may be too obvious to be treated as an UNP, and special treatment for the OP may result in a potentially unfair and non-best value decision by the Government.
Thirdly, not only should â€oepublic purposeâ€• and â€oepreliminary feasibilityâ€• tests be applied on such proposals, but must be a specific determination that fully competitive methods are unsuitable for the particular acquisition. Such a determination must be made available in the public domain in a meaningful way for competitors to be able to be aware of the reasons behind such a determination, and procedures should preferably be put in place for them to challenge such a determination before a designated agency contact.
Fourthly, there should be no government involvement in project development for UNPs, or, where such participation is essential to project development, the Government must provide equal support to competitors to develop their responses as it does to the OPs. Where government participation is through public assets, details of such assets and any other resources that can be claimed should be provided equally and fairly to competitors so as to enable them to formulate their own proposals based on equal information, on a par with the OP.
Fifthly, UNPs may not be entertained when an RFP is announced or when the proposal is in response to known agency requirements. Specifically, UNPs could be permitted to relate only to those projects that are not under consideration or contemplation in the Government.
Sixthly, the time for competitors to prepare counterproposals should be reasonable in relation to the time taken by the OP to develop the project right from the stage of submitting the original UNP. Similarly, the time for the OP to counter must be relatively short, since the OP is anyway in a superior position in terms of project familiarity.
Seventhly, the amount of information placed in the RFP inviting counterproposals in the case of an UNP must not be less detailed than that in a normal RFP, thus requiring the government agency to provide sufficiently detailed information that a competitor may rely on to submit a meaningful offer to the solicitation.
Finally, trading of an OPâ€™s rights to a price or negotiation advantage may need to be expressly disallowed, with strict requirements on the OP to perform the project as proposed, as any trading or rights may result in a first-come-firstserve situation with the kind of cybersquatting witnessed in the internet domain names registration process, or with spectrum squatting observed in the allocation of telecom spectrum in a number of countries, including India.
Each one of these recommendations can be further detailed and fine-tuned so as to provide better guidance, and the suggested measures should lead to greater transparency and uniformity in the use of UNPs. Adoption of these recommendations will also encourage and incentivise the submission of sound, truly innovative projects by OPs in the first place, and enhance bidder confidence and participation at all stages of the procurement, thus harnessing the strengths of UNPs in providing innovative and unique solutions to the countryâ€™s public infrastructure needs. The Practical Lawyer from the World Bank Groupâ€™s Infrastructure Action Program. It is a multi-donor technical assistance facility created to help Governments in developing countries improve the quality of infrastructure through partnerships with the private sector.
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